RT Journal Article
T1 A theoretical model of nations, regions and fiscal integration
A1 Ortuño, Ignacio
A1 Sempere, J.
AB This paper analyzes how the incentives of regions differ from those of nations when choosing a supranational fiscal arrangement. Two types of fiscal arrangements are studied: a Union of nations and a Federation of nations. Under the Union, there is full fiscal integration, and under the Federation, there is only partial fiscal integration and partial insurance against local risks. We show that the claim that regions have stronger incentives than nations to form a supranational Union rather than a Federation might be true only in the case where regions have strong incentives to be part of a centralized nation.
PB Elsevier
SN 0166-0462
YR 2006
FD 2006
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5506
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5506
LA eng
NO Ortuno-Ortin gratefully acknowledges financialsupport from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, Project SEJ2004-00968,Fundacion BBVA-3-04x and CAM 06/HSE/0157/2004
DS e-Archivo
RD 19 may. 2024