Publication:
Successful uninformed bidding

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5164
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002
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successful_hernando_GEB_2003_ps.pdf (585.37 KB)
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2004-07
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Elsevier
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Abstract
This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with more information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of less-informed bidders and a ratio of units for sale to bidders.
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Multi-unit auctions, Common value, Asymmetric bidders
Bibliographic citation
Games and Economic Behavior (2004), 48 (1), 29-53
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