Publication:
Successful uninformed bidding

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorHernando-Veciana, Ángeles
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-27T15:32:46Z
dc.date.available2014-05-27T15:32:46Z
dc.date.issued2004-07es
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with more information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of less-informed bidders and a ratio of units for sale to bidders.en
dc.description.statusPublicadoes
dc.format.extent25
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGames and Economic Behavior (2004), 48 (1), 29-53en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage29
dc.identifier.publicationissue1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage53
dc.identifier.publicationtitleGames and Economic Behavioren
dc.identifier.publicationvolume48
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/5164
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevieres
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/5175
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002
dc.rights© 2003 Elsevier Inc.en
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.jelD44
dc.subject.otherMulti-unit auctionsen
dc.subject.otherCommon valueen
dc.subject.otherAsymmetric biddersen
dc.titleSuccessful uninformed biddingen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dc.type.reviewPeerRevieweden
dspace.entity.typePublication
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