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Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4413
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0772
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Asymmetric _GEB_2000_ps.pdf (1.05 MB)
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2000
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Elsevier
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This paper studies the performance of two auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when partners' valuations for the assets are independent and asymmetrically distributed, with one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided. We provide results on existence, and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions. Comparative statics are developed, especially the differences between relative efficiency and revenue from the two auctions.
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Games and Economic Behavior. 2000, vol. 33, nº 1, p. 48-71
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