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The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4411
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2575
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1999
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Elsevier
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We study the asymptotic nucleolus of differentiable monopolistic market games in continuum economies with a finite number of traders' types, and show that, under appropriate assumptions, it is the center of symmetry of the subset of the eore in which all the monopolists receive the same payoff. Thus, the nucleolus di scriminates the traders in the atomless sector, whereas the competitive equilibrium does not. Moreover, if there is a single syndieated atom and a finite number of atomless sectors, the syndicate is treated more favorably under the asymptotic nucleolus than under the Shapley value associated with the pure monopolistie market.
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Journal of Economic Theory. 1999, vol. 89, nº 2, p.186-206
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