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The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorMoreno, Diego
dc.contributor.authorEiny, Ezra
dc.contributor.authorShitovitz, Benyamin
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-15T10:09:25Z
dc.date.available2009-06-15T10:09:25Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.description.abstractWe study the asymptotic nucleolus of differentiable monopolistic market games in continuum economies with a finite number of traders' types, and show that, under appropriate assumptions, it is the center of symmetry of the subset of the eore in which all the monopolists receive the same payoff. Thus, the nucleolus di scriminates the traders in the atomless sector, whereas the competitive equilibrium does not. Moreover, if there is a single syndieated atom and a finite number of atomless sectors, the syndicate is treated more favorably under the asymptotic nucleolus than under the Shapley value associated with the pure monopolistie market.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationJournal of Economic Theory. 1999, vol. 89, nº 2, p.186-206
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jeth.1999.2575
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/4411
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2575
dc.rights©Elsevier
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleThe asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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