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The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4187
ISSN: 1432-0479
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2318
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theory_JET_1997_ps.pdf (922.54 KB)
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1997
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Elsevier
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In this paper we study a situation where the planer cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is subsituted by the planneser herself. We assume(i) agents have complete information and play simultaneously and (ii) gieve the messages announced by the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necesary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions on the planner´s out-of equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation.
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Journal of Economic Theory. 1997, vol. 77, nº 1, p. 15-33
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