The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player

Publication:
The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author	Baliga, S.
dc.contributor.author	Sjostrom, T.
dc.date.accessioned	2009-05-11T15:06:45Z
dc.date.available	2009-05-11T15:06:45Z
dc.date.issued	1997
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we study a situation where the planer cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is subsituted by the planneser herself. We assume(i) agents have complete information and play simultaneously and (ii) gieve the messages announced by the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necesary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions on the planner´s out-of equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation.
dc.description.status	Publicado
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Journal of Economic Theory. 1997, vol. 77, nº 1, p. 15-33
dc.identifier.doi	10.1006/jeth.1997.2318
dc.identifier.issn	1432-0479
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4187
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.relation.publisherversion	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90043-H
dc.rights	©Elsevier
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.title	The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player
dc.type	research article	*
dc.type.review	PeerReviewed
dspace.entity.type	Publication

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