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Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3811
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00027-5
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CORCHON_1998_59_1_CL_ps.pdf (275.43 KB)
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1998
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Elsevier
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Abstract
Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good from an input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumption. We consider sharing rules that are a convex combination of the Proportional, the Equal Share and the Equal Benefit Rules. We characterize the subset of sharing rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and individual rationality.We also study the outcome of majority voting on this subselection of sharing rules.
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Sharing rule, Individual rationality, Voting
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Economics Letters. 1998, vol. 59, nº 1, p. 83-90
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