Publication:
Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production

Simple item page
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.authorPuy, M. Socorro
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-12T11:50:38Z
dc.date.available2009-03-12T11:50:38Z
dc.date.issued1998
dc.description.abstractSuppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good from an input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumption. We consider sharing rules that are a convex combination of the Proportional, the Equal Share and the Equal Benefit Rules. We characterize the subset of sharing rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and individual rationality.We also study the outcome of majority voting on this subselection of sharing rules.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationEconomics Letters. 1998, vol. 59, nº 1, p. 83-90
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00027-5
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/3811
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00027-5
dc.rights& 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.jelD50
dc.subject.jelD51
dc.subject.jelL31
dc.subject.jelL32
dc.subject.jelH82
dc.subject.jelP13
dc.subject.otherSharing rule
dc.subject.otherIndividual rationality
dc.subject.otherVoting
dc.titleIndividual rationality and voting in cooperative production
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
CORCHON_1998_59_1_CL_ps.pdf
Size:
275.43 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
Collections
DE - Artículos de Revistas
Economists Online