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Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3799
ISSN: 1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s100580300088
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CORCHON__RED_2003_7_4_CL-ps.pdf (383.18 KB)
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2003-02
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Springer
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In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
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Review of Economic Design. 2003, vol. 7, nº 4, p. 429-442
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