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Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.authorBeviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.authorWilkie, Simon
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-11T10:55:25Z
dc.date.available2009-03-11T10:55:25Z
dc.date.issued2003-02
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationReview of Economic Design. 2003, vol. 7, nº 4, p. 429-442
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s100580300088
dc.identifier.issn1434-4750
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/3799
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www.springerlink.com/content/y6a4vft38kuu6gu7/fulltext.pdf
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580300088
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleImplementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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