Publication: ¿Hay límites a la regresividad de derechos sociales?
Loading...
Identifiers
Publication date
2016-01
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas; Dykinson
Impact
Export
Abstract
La constatación de modificaciones legislativas que afectan negativamente al objeto
y alcance de derechos sociales y que dan lugar a retrocesos de los mismos
plantea importantes cuestiones sobre sus condiciones de posibilidad. En este artículo
se sostiene la tesis de acuerdo con la cual los retrocesos o la reversibilidad
de los derechos sociales son decisiones normativas limitadas fundamentalmente
por dos expedientes, garantías o salvaguardas. El primero es la posibilidad de
determinar un contenido esencial para los derechos sociales. El segundo radica
en situar el peso de la justificación de la decisión en la identificación de la legitimidad
del fin de la norma. Ambos conducen, en el ámbito de la argumentación,
a la consideración del principio de proporcionalidad como un razonamiento
complementario y subsidiario, pero no alternativo a la determinación del contenido
esencial en la argumentación sobre la obligación de no regresividad.
The consideration that legislative changes adversely affect the purpose and scope of social rights, also leading to various setbacks, raises important questions about the underlying enabling conditions. This paper argues that those regressions or the reversibility of social rights are normative decisions fundamentally limited in two ways. The first is the possibility to determine an essential content of social rights. The second lies with placing the weight of the justification of the decision in relation to the legitimacy of the norm. Both arguments lead to the consideration that the principle of proportionality can be seen as a complementary and alternative reasoning, but not as an alternative to the determination of the essential content in relation to the principle of non-regression.
The consideration that legislative changes adversely affect the purpose and scope of social rights, also leading to various setbacks, raises important questions about the underlying enabling conditions. This paper argues that those regressions or the reversibility of social rights are normative decisions fundamentally limited in two ways. The first is the possibility to determine an essential content of social rights. The second lies with placing the weight of the justification of the decision in relation to the legitimacy of the norm. Both arguments lead to the consideration that the principle of proportionality can be seen as a complementary and alternative reasoning, but not as an alternative to the determination of the essential content in relation to the principle of non-regression.
Description
Keywords
Derechos sociales, Obligación de no regresividad, Contenido esencial, Proporcionalidad, Fin legítimo, Social rights, Principle of non-regression, Essential content, Proportionality, Legitimate purpose
Bibliographic citation
Derechos y Libertades: revista de filosofía del derecho y derechos humanos, enero 2016, n. 34, pp. 57-90