Publication: Algunas cuestiones metateóricas relativas a la cuestión de la observación del fenómeno jurídico: una breve comparación entre positivismo jurídico metodológico y neoconstitucionalismo
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2010-01
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Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas; Dykinson
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Abstract
El constitucionalismo que se ha difundido en Europa tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, desde su comienzo, ha representado una explícita negación del anterior sistema jurídico , así como de su más consistente apoyo teórico, el positivismo jurídico, habiendo renovado, más o menos explícitamente, alguna de las más importantes dimensiones de un cierto iusnaturalismo, laico y racionalista. Ha venido a menos, principalmente, la idea por la cual el universo jurídico constituiría un ente cerrado y autorreferencial, en el que las normas se justifican y se legitiman de acuerdo con parámetros pertenecientes al mismo sistema jurídico. La teoría neoconstitucionalista, de modo particular en la interpretación que de ella ofrece Ronald Dworkin, se ha erigido en intérprete de estas exigencias, desarrollando un nuevo concepto de derecho capaz de dar cuenta también del componente moral incluido en los sistemas jurídicos constitucionalizados. En el presente artículo se ensaya una contraste entre dos diferentes modelos, limitando no obstante el análisis exclusivamente al ámbito del método, es decir a algunas cuestiones metateóricas relativas al punto de observación del fenómeno jurídico.
Constitutionalism, that spreaded through out Europe after the Second World War, has meant, since its beginning, a explicit denial of the former legal System and its more sound theoretical basis, legal positivism, renewing –more or less explicitly– some of the most important dimensions of a certain kind of secular and rationalist iusnaturalism. The idea that legal universe is a closed and selfreferential entity where rules are justified and get their legitimacy in accordance with parameters belonging to the legal system itself. The neoconstitutionalist theory, specially the interpretation that Ronald Dworking offers of it, has turned into interpreter of these requirements, developing a new concept of law able to explain the moral component included in the constitutionalized legal systems. In this article, a contrast between these two different models is essayed, though limited to the methodological field, that is to say, to some meta-theorical questions about the point of observation of legal phenomenon.
Constitutionalism, that spreaded through out Europe after the Second World War, has meant, since its beginning, a explicit denial of the former legal System and its more sound theoretical basis, legal positivism, renewing –more or less explicitly– some of the most important dimensions of a certain kind of secular and rationalist iusnaturalism. The idea that legal universe is a closed and selfreferential entity where rules are justified and get their legitimacy in accordance with parameters belonging to the legal system itself. The neoconstitutionalist theory, specially the interpretation that Ronald Dworking offers of it, has turned into interpreter of these requirements, developing a new concept of law able to explain the moral component included in the constitutionalized legal systems. In this article, a contrast between these two different models is essayed, though limited to the methodological field, that is to say, to some meta-theorical questions about the point of observation of legal phenomenon.
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neoconstitucionalismo, positivismo, metodología, neoconstitutionalism, positivism, metholodogy
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Derechos y Libertades: revista de filosofía del derecho y derechos humanos, enero 2010, n. 22, pp. 27-57