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Executive compensation in a dynamic model

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dc.contributor.advisorSantos, Manuel S.
dc.contributor.authorMorfov, Stanimir
dc.contributor.departamentoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-16T18:18:35Z
dc.date.available2010-03-16T18:18:35Z
dc.date.issued2009-03
dc.date.submitted2009-06
dc.description.abstractThe thesis generalizes the notion of commitment by defining the outside options on the history observed in a dynamic contractual setting. It studies how history dependence through reservation utilities affects the provision of insurance and incentives and the dynamics of the contract with a special focus on executive compensation. Stock options and contract terminations are also analyzed
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/7380
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherAnálisis dinámico
dc.subject.otherModelo de equilibrio general
dc.subject.otherDirección de empresas
dc.subject.otherEquilibrio económico
dc.subject.otherProgramación dinámica
dc.titleExecutive compensation in a dynamic model
dc.typedoctoral thesis*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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