Publication: Ontología y derecho. “Existencialismo” e institucionalismo
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2015-06
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Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas; Dykinson
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Abstract
La teoría analítica del derecho ha sido hostil durante mucho tiempo a cualquier
intento de definición “realista” del derecho. La acusación de “esencialismo” era
la más terrible y temida; la que más marcaba como insuficiente una perspectiva.
Sin embargo, como repite Alexy, refiriéndose a Kant, la definición es la representación
apropiada de su objeto, de manera que parece tener inevitablemente
un carácter “realista”. El nominalismo no se refiere a conceptos que quieren ser
“verdaderos” o “apropiados”. De manera que, por ejemplo, Joseph Raz rechaza
la idea hartiana, de derivacion wittgensteinianana, de los conceptos como
“semejanzas de familias”, y asume una posición fuertemente esencialista. Lo
mismo hace John Finnis, y toda la discusión sobre positivismo inclusivo o exclusivo.
El precio de tal desarrollo es el abandono del punto de vista interno;
un precio demasiado alto, ya que olvida el carácter de práctica participativa del
derecho mismo. El neoinstitucionalismo podría ser una salida a la alternativa
entre nominalismo y esencialismo, ya que reinterpreta el concepto de derecho,
no como “esencia” sino como “existencia”, espacio de acción abierto por normas
y completado por conductas variables.
The analytical theory of law has long been hostile to any attempt to “realistic” definition of law. The charge of “essentialism” was the most terrible and feared; the one that marked more a perspective as insufficient. However, as repeated Alexy, referring to Kant, the definition is the appropriate representation of its object, so it seems inevitably to have a “realistic” character. Nominalism does not refer to concepts wanting to be “true” or “appropriate”. So, for example, Joseph Raz rejects the Hartian idea, derived from Wittgenstein, of concepts as “family resemblances” and takes a strongly essentialist position. So does John Finnis, and any discussion of inclusive or exclusive positivism. The price of such development is the abandonment of the internal point of view; too high price as it forgets the character of participatory practice of law itself. Neoinstitucionalism could be a solution to the choice between essentialism and nominalism as reinterprets the concept of law, not as “essence” but as “existence”, as action space open by standards and completed by variable behaviors.
The analytical theory of law has long been hostile to any attempt to “realistic” definition of law. The charge of “essentialism” was the most terrible and feared; the one that marked more a perspective as insufficient. However, as repeated Alexy, referring to Kant, the definition is the appropriate representation of its object, so it seems inevitably to have a “realistic” character. Nominalism does not refer to concepts wanting to be “true” or “appropriate”. So, for example, Joseph Raz rejects the Hartian idea, derived from Wittgenstein, of concepts as “family resemblances” and takes a strongly essentialist position. So does John Finnis, and any discussion of inclusive or exclusive positivism. The price of such development is the abandonment of the internal point of view; too high price as it forgets the character of participatory practice of law itself. Neoinstitucionalism could be a solution to the choice between essentialism and nominalism as reinterprets the concept of law, not as “essence” but as “existence”, as action space open by standards and completed by variable behaviors.
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Keywords
Ontología, Existencialismo, Esencialismo, Nominalismo, Neoinstitucionalismo, Significado, Ontology, Existentialism, Essentialism, Nominalism, Neoinstitutionalism, Meaning
Bibliographic citation
Derechos y Libertades: revista de filosofía del derecho y derechos humanos, junio 2015, n. 33, pp. 17-46