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Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCorcho, Paula
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, José Luis
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-14T11:10:45Z
dc.date.available2009-12-14T11:10:45Z
dc.date.issued1997-05
dc.description.abstractCredible equilibria were defined in Ferreira, Gilboa and Maschler (1995) to handle situations of preferences changing along time in a model given by an extensive form game. This paper extends the definition to the case of infinite games and, more important, to games with nonperfect recall. These games are of great interest in possible applications of the model, but the original definition was not applicable to them. The difficulties of this extension are solved by using some ideas in the literatue of abstract systems and by proposing new ones that may prove useful in more general settings.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/6025
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries1997-36-14
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherBad sets
dc.subject.othercredible equilibrium
dc.subject.othergood sets
dc.subject.otherinfinite games
dc.subject.otherimperfect recall
dc.subject.othersemistable partitions
dc.subject.otherstable sets
dc.subject.otherugly sets
dc.titleCredible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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