Ortuño, IgnacioSempere, J.2014-05-302014-05-302006Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2006, v. 36, n. 1, pp. 132-1570166-0462https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5506This paper analyzes how the incentives of regions differ from those of nations when choosing a supranational fiscal arrangement. Two types of fiscal arrangements are studied: a Union of nations and a Federation of nations. Under the Union, there is full fiscal integration, and under the Federation, there is only partial fiscal integration and partial insurance against local risks. We show that the claim that regions have stronger incentives than nations to form a supranational Union rather than a Federation might be true only in the case where regions have strong incentives to be part of a centralized nation.application/pdfeng© ElsevierFederalismFiscal coinsuranceMigrationresearch articleH11H77H87Economía10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2005.07.001open access1321157Regional Science and Urban Economics36