Blázquez, MaiteJansen, Marcel2006-11-092006-11-092003-102340-5031http://hdl.handle.net/10016/301This paper analyzes the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with two types of workers and jobs. The technology is such that high-skill workers can perform all jobs, while low-skill workers can only perform unskilled jobs. In this setup two types equilibria may occur. A cross-skill matching equilibrium in which high-skill workers accept all jobs and an ex-post segmentation equilibrium in which they accept only skilled jobs. Our first result shows that the equilibrium with ex-post bargaining is never efficient. Second, under Hosios'(1990) condition we show that low-skill workers are overvalued, while the opposite holds for high-skill workers. In equilibrium, firms therefore create too few unskilled jobs and too many skilled jobs. In addition, high-skill workers may decide to accept unskilled jobs while the efficient allocation features ex-post segmentation. Finally, in an extension we show that efficiency can be restored through taxation and we analyze how workers bargaining strength affects unemployment and the degree of skill-mismatch.634406 bytesapplication/pdfengAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Españaworking paperEconomíaopen accesswe035019