Rincón-Zapatero, Juan PabloMartín-Herrán, G.2012-10-042012-10-042003Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 2003, vol. 119, nº 2, p. 395-4050022-3239https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5567The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this note, we present a method that allows us to decide when a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimum, without the explicit knowledge of the respective solutions. For that purpose, we establish a sufficient condition in terms of an algebraic inequality where the gradient of the value functions of the cooperative and noncooperative games as well as the state and control variables are involved.application/pdftext/plaineng© PlenumDifferential gamesMarkov-perfect Nash equilibriumPareto optimumHamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equationsresearch articleEconomía10.1023/B:JOTA.0000005453.96575.2aopen access3952405Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications119