Dhillon, AmritaUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía2009-04-082009-04-081995-072340-5031http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3912This paper introduces the 'Extended Pareto' axiom on Social welfare functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of two other axioms: Anonymity and Weak IIA* it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called Relative Utilitarianism that consists of normalizing individual utilities between zero and one and then adding them.application/pdfengAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaGroup PreferencesMulti-profileworking paperEconomíaopen access