Ruiz-Verdú, PabloSingh, RaviUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa2014-05-092014-05-092014-032341-0795http://hdl.handle.net/10016/18864We study how directors' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use ofcamouflaged forms of pay. We show that, in order to signal their independence to investors,boards lower managers' pay, but may also pay managers in hidden ways or structure compensationinefficiently. We also show that independent boards are more likely to make use of hiddencompensation than manager-friendly boards. We apply our model to study the costs and benefitsof greater pay transparency and of measures, such as say-on-pay initiatives, that increase boards'accountability to shareholdersapplication/pdfengAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaExecutive compensationBoard independenceHidden paySignalingDirectorReputationworking paperEmpresaopen accessDT/0000001200wb140704