Ganuza Fernández, Juan JosePenalva, José S.2022-05-092022-05-092019-03-01Ganuza, J.-J., & Penalva, J. (2019). Information disclosure in optimal auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 63, pp. 460–479.0167-7187https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34748This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers learn about their valu- ation of a go o d to b e sold. This setting is related to many real situations such as home sales, antique auctions, and digital platforms such as Google and Facebook selling online adver- tising slots. Two important questions arise: what is the op- timal selling mechanism, and what is the optimal disclosure policy of the seller. Under the assumption of private values, a simple auction with a reserve price is the optimal mechanism. What we show is that the amount of (costly) information pro- vided increases with the numb er of p otential bidders when using the optimal mechanism and is greater than when the object is always sold. Because information changes the distri- bution of a bidder’s expected valuations, the optimal reserve price also changes, so that the number of bidders (indirectly)eng© Elsevier, 2019Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaOptimal auctionPrivate valuesInformation disclosure and reserve priceresearch articleC72D44D82D83EconomíaEmpresahttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.11.004open access460479INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION63AR/0000022167