Alcalde, J.Romero-Medina, Antonio2012-10-192012-10-192000Games and Economic Behavior. 2000, vol. 31, nº 2, p. 294-3020899-8256https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5588This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.text/plainapplication/pdfeng© Academic PressMatching problemsresearch articleC78D78Economía10.1006/game.1999.0743open access2942302Games and Economic Behavior31