Kuvalekar, Aditya VijayRomero-Medina, AntonioUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía2021-01-132021-01-132021-01-132340-5031http://hdl.handle.net/10016/31711We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balanced." Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets in which fairness considerations are important.engAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaTwo-Sided MatchingFair ProcedureDeferred Acceptance Algorithmworking paperC72C78D41DT/0000001861