Corchón, Luis C.Ortuño, Ignacio2009-05-122009-05-121995Review Economic Design, 1995, v. 1, n. 1, pp. 159-1711434-4750http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4191The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbors and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the environment. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the firts, agents do not have priors about the relevant characteristics in the rest of the environment. In the second, agents are supposed to have priors about the unknown characteristics. We present a mechinism which implements any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto powe in both informational settings for every possible prior thus requiring little knowledge from the point of view ofthe desinner of the information possessed by agents about the environment.application/pdfeng© SpringerNash implementationIncomplete informationLocal informationresearch articleEconomía10.1007/BF02716619open access1Review Economic Design1