Einy, EzraMoreno, DiegoShitovitz, BenyaminUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía2009-12-162009-12-161999-022340-5031https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6120We study the Mas-Collel bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the "joint information» of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.application/pdfengAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaAtomless exchange economiesDifferential informationBargaining setworking paperEconomíaopen access