Marhuenda, FranciscoOrtuño Ortín, Ignacio2009-05-082009-05-081997Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1997, v. 99, n. 1, pp. 61-721467-9442 (Online)https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4178We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.application/pdfeng© Blackwellresearch articleEconomía10.1111/1467-9442.00047open access61172Scandinavian Journal of Economics99