García Díaz, AntónHernán, RobertoKujal, Praveen2012-07-192012-07-192009-11International journal of industrial organization, v. 27, n. 6, nov. 2009, pp. 719-7270167-7187https://hdl.handle.net/10016/14951List, or retail, pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage. Competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice. We modify the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount, or not, in a subsequent stage.We show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome. This is true for a general class of rationing rules. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.application/pdfeng©ElsevierList pricingDiscountsCapacity constrained modelsMixed strategiesPure strategiesStackelberg leaderresearch articleL0L14L11L13Economía10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.03.002open access7196727International journal of industrial organization27