Hagen, Martin NorbertHernando, Ángel2022-07-152023-09-012021-09-01Hagen, M., & Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2021). Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 196, p. 105317.0022-0531https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35479A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch condition. We provide a unified proof of both findings via the property of non-bossiness.eng© ElsevierAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaMechanism designBilateral tradeMultidimensional private informationPosted pricesDominant strategiesCollusion-proofnessresearch articleC72D82Economíahttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317open access129JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY196AR/0000029302