Shum, MatthewEsteban, SusannaMiyagawa, EiichiThe Johns Hopkins University. Department of Economics2009-08-262009-08-262003https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4995This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001a). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not enter the store. Consumers di®er in their preferences under temptation. When all consumers are tempted by more expensive, higher quality choices, the optimal menu is a singleton, which saves consumers from self-control and extracts consumers' commitment surplus. When some consumers are tempted by cheaper, lower quality choices, the optimal menu may contain a continuum of choices.application/pdfengTemptationSelf-controlCommitmentNonlinear pricingprice discriminationworking paperEconomíaopen access