Vilone, DanieleSánchez, AngelGómez-Gardeñes, Jesús2012-07-302012-07-302011-04Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, abril 2011, P04019 (15 pgs.)1742-5468https://hdl.handle.net/10016/15023We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the onedimensional Euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p of adding a link between two nodes not already connected in the Euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is greatly enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p → 1− cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promoting (or suppressing) cooperation.application/pdfengAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaGame-theoryModels for evolutionApplications to game theory and mathematical economicsInteracting agent modelsresearch articleMatemáticas10.1088/1742-5468/2011/04/P04019open access