Hernando-Veciana, Ángel2014-05-272014-05-272004-07Games and Economic Behavior (2004), 48 (1), 29-530899-8256https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5164This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with more information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of less-informed bidders and a ratio of units for sale to bidders.25application/pdfeng© 2003 Elsevier Inc.Multi-unit auctionsCommon valueAsymmetric biddersresearch articleD44Economía10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002open access29153Games and Economic Behavior48