Alipranti, MariaPetrakis, EmmanuelSkartados, PanagiotisUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía2021-09-142021-09-142021-09-142340-5031https://hdl.handle.net/10016/33271We consider a vertically related market in which an upstream monopolist supplier trades, via interim observable two-part tariff contracts, with two differentiated goods' downstream Cournot competitors. We show that passive partial backward ownership (PPBO) may be pro-competitive and welfare enhancing. PPBO exacerbates the upstream's commitment problem and yields lower wholesale prices, and higher industry output, consumers surplus, and welfare than in the absence of PPBO.engAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaPassive Partial Backward OwnershipVertical RelationsTwo-Part TariffsInterim Observable Contractsworking paperD43L13L14DT/0000001924