Einy, EzraMonderer, DovMoreno, Diego2009-05-142009-05-141998-04Economic Theory. 1998, vol. 11, nº 3, p. 585-6011432-0479 (Online)https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4219We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.application/pdfeng© Springerresearch articleEconomía10.1007/s001990050203open access