Frutos Casado, María Ángeles deLoyola Fuentes, Gino Gustavo2009-09-182009-09-182008-042008-07-22https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5244This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. We find that the optimal mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller's expected revenue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller's expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctionsapplication/pdfengAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaSubastaMercadosdoctoral thesisEconomíaopen access