Santos, AgustínFernández Anta, AntonioCuesta, José A.López Fernández, Luis2015-07-152015-07-152014-05International Conference on Networked Systems: NETYS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8593 (2014) pp. 70-83978-3-319-09580-60010-485X (Print)1436-5057 (Online)https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21425Proceeding of: Second International Conference,Networked Systems (NETYS 2014), took place 2014. May 15-17. in Marrakech, Morocco.Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose use payments in order to deal with selfishness. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.26application/pdfeng© Springer-VerlagComputer Communication NetworksAlgorithm Analysis and Problem ComplexityLinking mechanismFairnessResource allocationconference paperMatemáticashttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09581-3_6open access7083Lecture Notes in Computer Science8593CC/0000022622