Romero-Medina, AntonioTriossi, MatteoUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía2011-09-132011-09-132011-08-192340-5031https://hdl.handle.net/10016/12071This paper analyzes the role of acyclicity in singleton cores. We show that the absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Furthermore, acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores. If firms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is obtained through a procedure that resembles a serial dictatorship. Thus, acyclicity generalizes the notion of common preferences. It follows that if the firms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is strongly efficient for the other side of the marketapplication/pdfengAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaStable matchingAcyclicitySingleton coresworking paperC71C78D71Economíaopen accesswe1126