Cabolis, C.Manasakis, C.Moreno, DiegoPetrakis, EmmanuelUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía2016-07-042016-07-042016-06-012340-5031https://hdl.handle.net/10016/23280We study a homogenous good triopoly in which firms first choose their cost-reducing R&D investments and consider alternative merger proposals, and then compete à la Cournot in the ensuing industry. We identify conditions under which both horizontal mergers and non integration are sustained by Coalition-Proof Nash equilibria (CPNE). These conditions involve the effectiveness of the R&D technology, as well as the distribution of the bargaining power between the acquirer and the acquiree, which determine the allocation of the incremental profits generated by the merger. We show that whether firms follow duplicative or complementary research paths, sustaining a merger generally requires a sufficiently effective R&D technology that creates endogenous cost asymmetries and renders the merger profitable, and a moderate distribution of bargaining power that allows to spread the benefits of the merger. We examine the welfare effects of mergers and obtain clear policy guidelines.application/pdfengAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 EspañaHorizontal MergersCost-Reducing InnovationEndogenous Efficiency GainsAntitrustCoalition-Proof Nash Equilibriumworking paperopen accessDT/0000001467