Corchón, Luis C.Baliga, S.Sjostrom, T.2009-05-112009-05-111997Journal of Economic Theory. 1997, vol. 77, nº 1, p. 15-331432-0479https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4187In this paper we study a situation where the planer cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is subsituted by the planneser herself. We assume(i) agents have complete information and play simultaneously and (ii) gieve the messages announced by the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necesary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions on the planner´s out-of equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation.application/pdfeng©Elsevierresearch articleEconomía10.1006/jeth.1997.2318open access