RT Journal Article
T1 Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
A1 Name Correa, Álvaro
A1 Yildirim, Huseyin
AB We examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whose members fear being blamed by interested observers for casting an unfavorable vote. We show that while individually undesirable, such social pressure can improve the collective decision by mitigating a voting externality. Hence, organizations may adopt public voting when the fear of blame is too little, and secret voting when the fear is too much. We also show that public voting is particularly desirable in committees with overly biased members or overly biased voting rules against the alternative. Anecdotal evidence supports our findings.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-0531
YR 2019
FD 2019-11-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34832
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34832
LA eng
NO Financial supports from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, grant #ECO2013-42710-P,and Juan de la Cierva Fellowship (Name-Correa), as well as the dean’s research fund at Duke University (Yildirim)are greatly appreciated
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024