RT Journal Article
T1 New method to characterize subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in differential games
A1 Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo
A1 Martínez, J.
A1 Martín-Herrán, G.
AB In this paper, we present a method for computing Nash equilibria in feedback strategies. This method gives necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize subgame perfect equilibria by means of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This characterization allows one to know explicitly the solution of the game in some cases. In other cases, this approach makes a qualitative study easier. We apply this method to nonrenewable resource games.
PB Springer
SN 0022-3239
YR 1998
FD 1998
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5560
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5560
LA eng
NO The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
DS e-Archivo
RD 19 may. 2024