RT Journal Article
T1 Imperfect imitation can enhance cooperation
A1 Pérez Roca, Carlos
A1 Cuesta, José A.
A1 Sánchez, Angel
AB The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with another imitative rule. We find that, surprisingly, in many social dilemmas this rule yields higher cooperative levels than any of the two original ones. This nontrivial effect occurs because the basic rules induce a separation of timescales in the microscopic processes at cluster interfaces. The result is robust in the space of 2×2 symmetric games, on regular lattices and on scale-free networks.
PB EDP Sciences
PB IOP Publishing
SN 0295-5075 (Print)
SN 1286-4854 (Online)
YR 2009
FD 2009-08
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7194
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7194
LA eng
NO 5 pages, 4 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 89.65.-s.-- ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.0869
NO This work is supported by MICINN (Spain) under Grants Ingenio-MATHEMATICA and MOSAICO, and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) under Grants SIMUMAT-CM and MOSSNOHO-CM.
DS e-Archivo
RD 27 jul. 2024