RT Journal Article
T1 Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminatory
A1 Fabra, Natalia
AB Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct ofcollusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose,I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctionsfacilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimalpenal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders’ deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the payoff irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. Thisdiscussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in theelectricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.
PB Blackwell
SN 1467-6451
YR 2003
FD 2003-09
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5000
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5000
LA eng
NO This is the accepted version of the following article: Fabra, N. (2003), Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 51(3), 271–293, which has been published in final form at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00201
DS e-Archivo
RD 8 may. 2024