RT Generic
T1 Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations
A1 Alcalde, J.
A1 Pérez-Castrillo, D. J.
A1 Romero-Medina, Antonio
A2 IVIE, 
AB We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents`preference are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium that firms`optimal correspondence when firms employ undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism to implement workers`optimal correspondence when agents`preferences are additive.
YR 1997
FD 1997
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5626
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5626
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 19 may. 2024