RT Generic
T1 Information disclosure in optimal auctions
A1 Ganuza, Juan-José
A1 Penalva, José
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto para el Desarrollo Empresarial (INDEM), 
AB A celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard privatevalue setting does not depend on the number of bidders. We modify the framework by consideringthat the seller controls the accuracy with which bidders learn their valuations, and show that insuch a case, the greater the number of bidders the more restrictive the reserve price. We alsoshow that the auctioneer provides more information when using an optimal auction mechanismthan when the object is always sold.
SN 1989-8843
YR 2014
FD 2014-03
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/18543
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/18543
LA eng
NO Juan-José Ganuzagratefully acknowledges the support of the Barcelona GSE Research, the government of Catalonia, and the SpanishMinistry of Education and Science Through Project ECO 2011-28965. Jose Penalva acknowledgesthe support of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science Through Project ECO 2012-36559.
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RD 30 jun. 2024