RT Journal Article
T1 Ideological versus Downsian political competition
A1 Ortuño, Ignacio
AB We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competitionwith two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters’ types. We assumethat parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians;members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on thecontrary, care only about winning the election. We consider two possibilities:that members choose the political platforms and that professional politiciansare the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party membersis analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicianshave no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both partiesto let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in whichprofessional politicians have much better information than the members of theparty about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expectedutility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professionalpoliticians choose.
PB Springer
SN 1432-217X
YR 2002
FD 2002
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5500
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5500
LA eng
NO The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
NO I wish to acknowledge financial support from the SpanishMinistry of Educacion, projects no. PB94 1504, PB93 0342, PB97 0131 and D.G.I.C.T.mobility grant
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