RT Journal Article
T1 Direct method comparing efficient and non-efficient payoffs in differential games
A1 Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo
A1 Martín-Herrán, G.
AB In this note, we present a method that allows us to decide when a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimum, without the explicit knowledge of the respective solutions. For that purpose, we establish a sufficient condition in terms of an algebraic inequality where the gradient of the value functions of the cooperative and noncooperative games as well as the state and control variables are involved.
PB Springer
SN 0022-3239
YR 2003
FD 2003
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5567
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5567
LA eng
NO The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
NO The first author acknowledges financial support from Junta de Castilla y León Project VA108 01 and Dirección General de Investigación Project BFM2002–00425.The second author acknowledges financial support from JCYL Project VA051 03 and MCYTProject BEC2002-0236, cofinanced by FEDER funds.
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RD 19 may. 2024