RT Generic
T1 Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism
A1 Dhillon, Amrita
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB This paper introduces the 'Extended Pareto' axiom on Social welfare functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of two other axioms: Anonymity and Weak IIA* it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called Relative Utilitarianism that consists of normalizing individual utilities between zero and one and then adding them.
SN 2340-5031
YR 1995
FD 1995-07
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3912
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3912
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 27 abr. 2024