RT Generic
T1 Some results on strategic voting and proportional representation with multidimensional policy space
A1 De Sinopoli, Francesco
A1 Iannantuoni, Giovanna
AB We study a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. We first show, via an example, that the assumption of quasi-concavity of the utility function is not sufficient to obtain the result that only the extreme parties get votes, contrary to the unidimensional case. We, then, study two cases in which stronger assumptions on voters' preferences assure that voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2002
FD 2002-11
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/281
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/281
LA eng
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024